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OPINION OF THE COURT
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SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

At issue in this interlocutory appeal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(f) is whether the District Court properly certified a
nationwide class of employees alleging a pattern or practice of
unlawful discrimination under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117.
Analogizing to pattern-or-practice discrimination suits brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e–2000e-17, the District Court found certain of named
plaintiffs’ claims and requested relief could be adjudicated on
a classwide basis in a manner consistent with Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2). We disagree, and will reverse the court’s grant of class
certification and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.
Named plaintiffs Mark Hohider, Robert DiPaolo, and
Preston Eugene Branum (“plaintiffs”) are employees of
package-delivery company United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”).
They brought this civil action against UPS on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging UPS has
adopted and implemented companywide employment policies
that are unlawfully discriminatory under the ADA. On March
10, 2004, plaintiffs Hohider and DiPaolo filed suit under the
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ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,1 and on June 29, 2004, they
moved for class certification. The District Court permitted
limited discovery with respect to the class certification motion.2
On November 4, 2004, while that discovery was proceeding,
plaintiff Branum filed a similar suit against UPS, alleging
discriminatory practices in violation of the ADA and seeking
class treatment of his claims. Counsel for Hohider and DiPaolo
moved to consolidate the two cases, which UPS opposed. The
court initially granted consolidation for the purpose of discovery
only, and subsequently consolidated the cases for all purposes.
Plaintiffs’ claims of unlawful discrimination focus on
UPS’s alleged treatment of employees who attempt to return to
work at UPS after having to take leave for medical reasons.
Hohider, DiPaolo, and Branum each suffered an injury of some
sort during the course of their employment with UPS, leaving
them unable to return to their respective previous positions at
the company without some form of permanent medical
1

The Rehabilitation Act claim was withdrawn in response to
a motion to dismiss by UPS.
2

UPS divides its operations within the United States into
sixty geographic districts. For the purpose of evaluating the
motion for class certification, the District Court permitted
discovery from five of these districts, including “the Laurel
Mountain district directly implicated by the individual named
plaintiffs’ allegations.” Hohider v. UPS, 243 F.R.D. 147, 156
(W.D. Pa. 2007).
7

restriction.3 Their subsequent attempts to resume work at UPS
were unsuccessful. According to plaintiffs, UPS, as a matter of
companywide policy, refuses to offer any accommodation to
employees seeking to return to work with medical restrictions,
effectively precluding them from resuming employment at UPS
in any capacity because of their impaired condition. Namely,
plaintiffs allege UPS
(1) enforce[es] a “100% release” or “no
restrictions” unwritten policy, which prohibits
employees from returning to UPS in any vacant
position unless the employee can return to his or
her last position without any medical restrictions;
(2) disseminat[es] a written corporate “ADA

3

Hohider began at UPS in 1986 as a part-time
loader/unloader, and worked part-time in various positions at
UPS in the subsequent years, including as a loader, a sorter, and
a package-car driver. In 1999, a vehicle he was operating at
work was struck from behind, resulting in an injury to his back
later diagnosed to be disc herniation with left leg radiculopathy.
UPS hired DiPaolo in 1972 as a part-time loader/unloader, and
he became a full-time package-car driver in 1978. He suffered
a workplace injury in 1997 and developed reflex sympathetic
dystrophy, a neurological disorder. Branum started working as
a mechanic at UPS in 1981. He suffered a neck injury on the
job which required surgery in November 2004. See Hohider,
243 F.R.D. at 229–30.
8

compliance policy,” which is implemented
nationwide to delay and avoid providing
accommodations, that is illegal, both on its face
and as applied;
(3) us[es] uniform job descriptions, which
intentionally fail to describe the essential
functions of available UPS jobs, as a pretext to
prevent disabled employees from holding any
UPS job;
(4) prohibit[s] employees from returning to work
in an alternative job within the employees’
restrictions and prevent[s] employees from using
union seniority rights to transfer to a position that
accommodates their disabilities;
(5) withdraw[s] accommodations previously
provided to disabled workers, and then den[ies]
requests for the previously provided
accommodations; and
(6) treat[s] persons who make requests for
accommodations differently and less favorably in
the terms, conditions, rights and privileges, of or
incident to, their employment as a result of
engaging in this protected act under the ADA.

Hohider v. UPS, 243 F.R.D. 147, 153 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (citing
9

Pls.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Class Certification 3–4). These policies of
non-accommodation, plaintiffs contend, constitute patterns and
practices of intentional discrimination prohibited under the
ADA.
Plaintiffs asked the District Court to certify a nationwide
class with respect to these claims, and sought various forms of
classwide relief, including injunctive and declaratory relief,
back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiffs
proposed the following class definition for certification:
4

Those persons throughout the United States who:
(i) according to the records of UPS, its agents and
contractors have been employed by UPS at any
time since May 10, 2000, including those
employees absent from work and receiving either
workers’ compensation or short or long term
disability insurance benefits; and (ii) have been
absent from work because of a medical
impairment; and (iii) are disabled as defined
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA); and (iv) have attempted to return to work
or continue to work at UPS or have submitted to
UPS a medical release that permits the employee
4

Based on the discovery performed in UPS’s five sample
districts, “plaintiffs extrapolated . . . that there are potentially
36,290 class members, although there could be more or less than
that number.” Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 213.
10

to work with restrictions and conditions, or have
been disqualified by UPS from returning to work;
and (v) were harmed as a result of UPS’s policies,
practices and procedures that control reentry into
the workplace or otherwise govern the making of
reasonable accommodations under Title I of the
ADA to employees in UPS’s workforce.
Excluded from the Class are all presently working
UPS management employees with supervisory
authority over the formulation or implementation
of the UPS policies and practices alleged in this
action to violate the ADA.
Id. at 154 (citing Pls.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Class Certification 4–5).
The District Court analyzed plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2).5 The court

5

According to their original complaint, plaintiffs Hohider and
DiPaolo “br[ought] this action as a class action pursuant to Rule
23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Hohider & DiPaolo Compl. ¶ 19. The District
Court found, however, that “[s]ubsequent filings with the court,
and in particular plaintiffs’ briefing in support of their motion
for class certification, . . . indicate that plaintiffs seek
certification solely under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2).”
Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 233; see Pls.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Class
Certification 4, 39.
11

premised its analysis on a two-stage evidentiary framework that
the Supreme Court has promulgated for adjudicating pattern-orpractice claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, discussed in greater detail infra. Applying
this framework to plaintiffs’ ADA claims, the court found three
of them satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
Accordingly, the court certified those claims for class treatment,
and modified plaintiffs’ proposed class definition to incorporate
them. The court also removed from the proposed class
definition the requirement that class members be “disabled as
defined under the [ADA]” and “harmed as a result of UPS’s
policies, practices and procedures that control reentry into the
workplace or otherwise govern the making of reasonable
accommodations under Title I of the ADA to employees in
UPS’s workforce.” According to the court, “[t]his exclusion
would make determining membership in the class less
problematic by removing the criteria which require what are
arguably legal conclusions and may entail individualized
inquiries,” Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 209, and would place the
“focus on the alleged conduct at issue rather than the ease of
identifying the class members prior to determinations of
liability,” which it considered most fitting for the broad
injunctive relief sought under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 210. The
court approved for certification the following modified class
definition:
Those persons throughout the United States who:
(i) according to the records of UPS, its agents and
12

contractors, have been employed by UPS at any
time since May 10, 2000, including those
employees who were absent from work and were
receiving either workers’ compensation or short
or long term disability insurance benefits; and
(ii) have been absent from work because of
medical reasons; and
(iii)(A) did not return to work by reason of UPS’s
alleged 100% healed policy; or
(B) did not return to work by reason of UPS’s
allegedly discriminatory implementation of its
formal ADA compliance policy; or
(C) did not return to work by reason of the
allegedly discriminatory use by UPS of uniform
pretextual job descriptions.6

6

The District Court detailed the factual background of the
discriminatory policies alleged in the three claims certified for
class treatment. See Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 166–85. We will
not replicate that effort here, but offer a brief summary of those
policies to provide context for our analysis on appeal. As noted,
plaintiffs allege UPS has an unofficial, companywide “100%
healed” policy, under which “UPS systematically requires
employees attempting to return from medical leave to present a
full medical release— one without any permanent
restriction—certifying that the employee is able to perform the
13

‘essential functions’ of the employee’s last job before allowing
them to return to work in any capacity at UPS.” Pls.’ Br. 4.
UPS has in place an official, written ADA compliance
procedure, which outlines a ten-step process whereby employees
with impairments can interact with various management
personnel at UPS to determine whether their conditions can be
reasonably accommodated. Plaintiffs allege, however, that
“[t]his so-called ‘ten-step accommodation process’ is the
embodiment of bad faith and discriminatory intent,” as it
“unquestionably is intended, designed and administered only to
unnecessarily delay and prevent the provision of reasonable
accommodations as the usual practice, while creating a false
record of procedural compliance with the ADA” and reinforcing
UPS’s actual, unlawfully discriminatory policy that only
employees “100% healed” may return to work at UPS. Pls.’ Br.
Supp. Mot. Class Certification 3, 15.
Plaintiffs also allege UPS’s official job descriptions
include extraneous and excessively demanding physical
requirements, which are designed to foreclose impaired
employees from qualifying for employment in any position at
UPS. For example, plaintiffs contend almost every job
description at UPS lists a seventy-pound lifting requirement as
an “essential function” of the position, even though many of the
positions would rarely, if ever, require such ability. See id. at
27; see also id. (“This 70-pound lifting requirement is even
claimed by UPS to be an essential function of management jobs
although the collective bargaining agreement prohibits
14

Excluded from the Class are all presently working
UPS management employees with supervisory
authority over the formulation or implementation
of the UPS policies and practices alleged in this
action to violate the ADA.
Id. at 246. As to relief, the court determined plaintiffs’ claims
for compensatory and punitive damages could not be certified
for classwide treatment under Rule 23(b)(2), but it withheld
judgment on plaintiffs’ back-pay claims, concluding that
“[p]laintiffs . . . may be able to seek back pay or other equitable
relief for individual class members if there is a protocol for

management from doing this jealously-guarded ‘union work.’”).
It is not clear whether there are other aspects of UPS’s job
descriptions in addition to this lifting requirement that plaintiffs
consider pretextual and discriminatory. Furthermore, though the
District Court certified this claim regarding UPS’s use of
pretextual job descriptions, it expressed uncertainty in its
certification analysis over whether the allegation was intended
to assert an independent violation of the ADA, or only to
provide evidentiary support for plaintiffs’ other claims. See
Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 221 n.87 (noting that “[i]f this claim
otherwise satisfies Rule 23, plaintiffs will need to refine whether
they are challenging the use of these job descriptions as
alternative violations of the ADA or relying on this policy as
evidentiary support for the challenge to UPS’s overall formal
ADA compliance policy”).
15

identifying those monetary damages which sets forth the
objective standards to be utilized in determining the amount of
those damages in a way that does not require additional hearings
on individualized circumstances.” Id. at 245. The court also
noted that, having certified the class, it would revisit at a
subsequent status conference with the parties the issue of
bifurcating the proceedings in accordance with the two-stage
evidentiary framework mentioned supra (having previously
denied without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion for bifurcation,
subject to the court’s decision on class certification). Id. at
244–45. UPS petitioned for permission to appeal the grant of
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), which we granted.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). “We review a
class certification order for abuse of discretion, which occurs if
the district court’s decision ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper
application of law to fact.’” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d
Cir. 2001)). “[W]hether an incorrect legal standard has been
used is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo.” Id. (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Class certification is proper only ‘if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ of Rule
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23 are met.”7 Id. at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “Because the decision whether to
certify a class ‘requires a thorough examination of the factual

7

As we recently noted,
[c]lass certification under Rule 23 has two
primary components. The party seeking class
certification must first establish the four
requirements of Rule 23(a): “(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class
[commonality]; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class [adequacy].”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If all four requirements of
Rule 23(a) are met, a class of one of three types
(each with additional requirements) may be
certified. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309–10 n.6. This class
has been certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which applies to class
actions where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2).
17

and legal allegations,’ the court’s rigorous analysis may include
a ‘preliminary inquiry into the merits,’ and the court may
‘consider the substantive elements of the plaintiffs’ case in order
to envision the form that a trial on those issues would take.’”
Id. at 317 (citations omitted) (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 166,
168); see also id. at 319 (“A critical need is to determine how
the case will be tried.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note, 2003 Amendments)). “A district court that
premises its legal analysis on an erroneous understanding of the
governing law has abused its discretion.” Oscar Private Equity
Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.
2007).
As noted, the District Court certified for classwide
treatment plaintiffs’ claims regarding “UPS’s alleged 100%
healed policy,” “UPS’s allegedly discriminatory implementation
of its formal ADA compliance policy,” and “the allegedly
discriminatory use by UPS of uniform pretextual job
descriptions.” Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 246. The court
concluded that, “with respect to [these three] class claims,
plaintiffs may seek appropriate equitable relief including
injunctive and declaratory relief and monetary damages
incidental to the requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id.
at 245. UPS raises numerous challenges to this grant of
certification, many of which stem from its contention that
adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims requires the court to assess
whether the named plaintiffs and the class members are
“qualified individuals with disabilities,” as defined under the
ADA. This assessment, according to UPS, would entail too
18

many individualized inquiries for class treatment to be
warranted.
The District Court recognized that inquiries necessary to
the “qualified individual with a disability” assessment could not
be adjudicated with respect to this class in a manner consistent
with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), but found these inquiries did not
preclude certification of the claims and relief specified above.
Central to this conclusion was the court’s determination that
these claims could be tried under the “Teamsters framework,”
a two-stage method of proof promulgated by the Supreme Court
for adjudicating pattern-or-practice claims brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: according to the court,
“whether plaintiffs can proceed under the Teamsters pattern-orpractice framework is key to the decision whether class
certification is appropriate in this case because it bears directly
on the elements of the prima facie case that plaintiffs will have
to prove at the liability stage of this litigation.” Id. at 192.
Relying on the Teamsters framework as it has been applied in
the Title VII context, the District Court found it could determine
whether UPS engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful
discrimination, as contemplated at the “liability” stage of that
framework, without evaluating whether plaintiffs and class
members were “qualified” under the ADA. Accordingly, the
court concluded it need not consider this “qualified” standard,
and the individualized inquiries it would entail with respect to
the proposed class, in deciding whether the “liability” stage of
plaintiffs’ claims could be certified. As we discuss, however, in
this case it is not possible to reach a classwide determination of
19

unlawful discrimination without undertaking analysis of
qualification, as it is defined by the ADA. Contrary to the
District Court’s conclusion, adopting the Teamsters method of
proof to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims does not obviate the need
to consider the ADA’s statutory elements. We believe this error
in identifying the legal standard controlling plaintiffs’ claims
resulted in an improper grant of class certification.

III.
A.
At the outset, a brief review of the origins of the
Teamsters framework is in order. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), presented an
employment discrimination suit brought by the United States
under § 707(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6(a).8 The government alleged the employer engaged in

8

Section 707(a) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by this subchapter, and that the
pattern or practice is of such a nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights
herein described, the Attorney General may bring
a civil action in the appropriate district court of
20

a pattern or practice of employment discrimination prohibited
under Title VII. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329. In analyzing this
claim, the Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument that
“the Government’s burden of proof in a pattern-or-practice case
must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green.”9 Id. at 357. Noting that “[o]ur decision in [McDonnell

the United States by filing with it a complaint (1)
signed by him (or in his absence the Acting
Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts
pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3)
requesting such relief, including an application for
a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order or other order against the person or persons
responsible for such pattern or practice, as he
deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of
the rights herein described.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). As noted in Teamsters, § 707 has been
amended “to give the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, rather than the Attorney General, the authority to
bring ‘pattern or practice’ suits under that section against
private-sector employers.” 431 U.S. at 329 n.1.
9

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
the Court found that
[t]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry
the initial burden under the statute of establishing
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This
21

Douglas] . . . did not purport to create an inflexible formulation”
for analyzing claims of discrimination under Title VII, the Court
looked to its previous decision in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), which addressed a
class-action pattern-or-practice claim of race discrimination
under Title VII. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358–59. Drawing on
the method of proof it used in Franks to adjudicate the class’s
claims, the Court promulgated a two-stage framework for
analyzing Title VII pattern-or-practice suits. It defined the first
stage as follows:
The plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice action is the
Government, and its initial burden is to

may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant’s qualifications.
Id. at 802. Once this prima facie case has been made, “[t]he
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
rejection.” Id. The complainant would then “be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason for [the
complainant’s] rejection was in fact pretext.” Id. at 804.
22

demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has
been a regular procedure or policy followed by an
employer or group of employers. At the initial,
“liability” stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the
Government is not required to offer evidence that
each person for whom it will ultimately seek
relief was a victim of the employer’s
discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a
prima facie case that such a policy existed. The
burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the
prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by
demonstrating that the Government’s proof is
either inaccurate or insignificant. . . .
If an employer fails to rebut the inference
that arises from the Government’s prima facie
case, a trial court may then conclude that a
violation has occurred and determine the
appropriate remedy.
Without any further
evidence from the Government, a court’s finding
of a pattern or practice justifies an award of
prospective relief. Such relief might take the
form of an injunctive order against continuation
of the discriminatory practice, an order that the
employer keep records of its future employment
decisions and file periodic reports with the court,
or any other order “necessary to ensure the full
enjoyment of the rights” protected by Title VII.
Id. at 360–61 (citation omitted). To establish liability for a
23

pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination, “the Government
ultimately ha[s] to prove more than the mere occurrence of
isolated or ‘accidental’ or sporadic discriminatory acts. It ha[s]
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [the
alleged] discrimination was the company’s standard operating
procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Id. at
336. The Court emphasized that “at the liability stage of a
pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual
hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory
decisionmaking. While a pattern might be demonstrated by
examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the
Government’s suits have more commonly involved proof of the
expected result of a regularly followed discriminatory policy.”
Id. at 360–61 n.46.
The second, “remedial” stage of the Teamsters
framework pertains to individual relief, and is reached only after
liability is established in the first stage of analysis:
When the Government seeks individual
relief for the victims of the discriminatory
practice, a district court must usually conduct
additional proceedings after the liability phase of
the trial to determine the scope of individual
relief. . . . [T]he question of individual relief does
not arise until it has been proved that the
employer has followed an employment policy of
unlawful discrimination. The force of that proof
does not dissipate at the remedial stage of the
24

trial. The employer cannot, therefore, claim that
there is no reason to believe that its individual
employment decisions were discriminatorily
based; it has already been shown to have
maintained a policy of discriminatory
decisionmaking.
The proof of the pattern or practice
supports an inference that any particular
employment decision, during the period in which
the discriminatory policy was in force, was made
in pursuit of that policy. The Government need
only show that an alleged individual
discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for a job and
therefore was a potential victim of the proved
discrimination. As in Franks, the burden then
rests on the employer to demonstrate that the
individual applicant was denied an employment
opportunity for lawful reasons.

Id. at 361–62 (footnote omitted).10 According to the Court, this

10

If the employer offers a nondiscriminatory justification for
its conduct, that justification “will be subject to further evidence
by the Government that the purported reason for an applicant’s
rejection was in fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362 n.50 (citing McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804–06).
25

inference of discrimination in favor of the individual employee
at the second stage of proceedings is an appropriate
consequence of the liability determination at the first Teamsters
stage because, inter alia, “the finding of a pattern or practice [of
unlawful discrimination] change[s] the position of the employer
to that of a proved wrongdoer.” Id. at 359–60 n.45.
In Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467
U.S. 867 (1984), the Court noted that “[a]lthough Teamsters
involved an action litigated on the merits by the Government as
plaintiff under § 707(a) of [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], it is
plain that the elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice case
are the same in a private class action.” Id. at 876 n.9. The
Cooper Court observed that, under this two-stage framework,
“[w]hile a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination itself
justifies an award of prospective relief to the class, additional
proceedings are ordinarily required to determine the scope of
individual relief for the members of the class.” Id. at 876 (citing
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361). The Court elaborated on the
distinction between an individual claim of discrimination
adjudicated under the McDonnell Douglas framework, where
the focus is on uncovering “the reason for a particular
employment decision,” and a class-based pattern-or-practice
claim under the Teamsters framework, which focuses at the
“liability” stage not “‘on individual hiring decisions, but on a
pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking.’” Id. (quoting
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360 n.46). Thus, in the class context,
“the existence of a valid individual claim does not necessarily
warrant the conclusion that the individual plaintiff may
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successfully maintain a class action,” just as “a class plaintiff’s
attempt to prove the existence of a companywide policy . . . may
fail even though discrimination against one or two individuals
has been proved.” Id. at 877–78 (drawing on Falcon, 457 U.S.
147).11

11

Since Cooper, courts of appeals have used the Teamsters
two-stage framework to analyze pattern-or-practice claims
brought as private-plaintiff class actions under Title VII, see,
e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d
147, 158–60 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir. 1998), as well as under other
statutes such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
see Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852–65 (3d Cir.
1987).
No court of appeals has addressed directly if and how this
framework might apply to a private-plaintiff pattern-or-practice
class action under the ADA, though some have touched upon the
issue in passing. In Bates v. UPS, 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed
a district court’s treatment of an ADA private-plaintiff class
action under the Teamsters pattern-or-practice framework. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that applying Teamsters in that case
was unnecessary, because “[t]he fact to be uncovered by such a
[burden-shifting] protocol—whether the employer made an
employment decision on a proscribed basis (here, disability in
the form of hearing impairment)—[wa]s not in dispute.” Id. at
988. Thus, while the Ninth Circuit declined to apply Teamsters,
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it did not disavow it as an appropriate framework to apply when
the existence of the alleged discriminatory policy is in question,
as it is here.
In Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999), the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to permit the government to go forward with an
ADA pattern-or-practice claim under the Teamsters framework,
stating that “Teamsters sets forth a logical and efficient
framework for allocating burdens of proof in pattern and
practice employment discrimination suits, and we approve of the
district court’s use of that framework in this case.” Id. at 1148.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of
certification to the private class of plaintiffs seeking to bring the
same substantive claims as the government. The district court
had found that determining whether class members were
“disabled” under the ADA would require “‘necessarily
individualized inquiries’ [that] are best suited to a case-by-case
determination” and that rendered the class uncertifiable. Davoll
v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 146 (D. Colo. 1995) (quoting
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The Tenth Circuit noted that, unlike the plaintiffs’ class suit, “a
pattern and practice action brought by the United States pursuant
to section 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, is not subject
to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.” Davoll, 194 F.3d at
1147 n.20 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,
327 & n.9 (1980)). Nonetheless, the court also noted that “[w]e
understand plaintiffs’ concern that by denying their class
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B.
The District Court reviewed the Franks, Teamsters, and
Cooper decisions, and concluded their framework for analyzing
a Title VII pattern-or-practice claim is properly applied to a
private-plaintiff class action brought under the ADA.
According to the court, “[t]his result is compelled by the
Supreme Court’s decisions [in those three cases] and because
the ADA incorporates the remedies afforded to plaintiffs
litigating claims pursuant to Title VII.”12 Hohider, 243 F.R.D.
at 208. The court found “no legal authority supporting a
categorical prohibition against litigating ADA claims pursuant

certification motion and upholding the United States pattern and
practice action, this decision may be interpreted as holding that
only the government can bring a class-wide ADA employment
suit. Such an interpretation would be unfounded.” Id. at 1146
n.20.
12

The ADA incorporates by reference 42 U.S.C. § 2000e6(a), the provision, noted supra, that authorizes the government
to bring pattern-or-practice suits under Title VII. See ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (“The powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and
2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and
procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the
Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this
chapter . . . .”).
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to a Rule 23(b)(2) class action utilizing [the Teamsters]
framework.” Id. at 205. It reviewed the sparse appellate case
law that has touched upon this issue and concluded those cases
supported, or were at least consistent with, the application of
this framework to plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, the court
adopted the Teamsters framework, and proposed the following
method for its application to the class:
Plaintiffs . . . will be allowed to litigate their
pattern-or-practice claims for injunctive relief
pursuant to the elements of a prima facie case set
forth in Teamsters and will not be required to
make out the elements for an individual ADA
claim if some or all of their claims are certified
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Here,
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of a
pattern or practice that is discriminatory under the
ADA must show at the initial liability stage that
such a policy existed—not that each person for
whom they are seeking relief was a victim of the
allegedly discriminatory policy. If plaintiffs do
so, the burden then shifts to defendant to defeat
this prima facie case. If defendant fails to rebut
this prima facie case that a discriminatory policy
existed, broad-based prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief may be warranted. If plaintiffs
are permitted to seek individual relief, the court
may need to conduct additional proceedings with
respect to the scope of individual relief.
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Id. at 208 (footnote omitted). The court found that, “under the
pattern-or-practice framework, at the initial liability stage,
plaintiffs need not prove that each member of the class was a
qualified individual with a disability or individually entitled to
reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 229. Rather, “the individual
elements of a reasonable accommodation claim may be relevant
at the second, remedial stage of proceedings if plaintiffs seek
individual relief on behalf of individual class members.”13 Id.

13

The District Court did not make clear whether this second
Teamsters stage would occur with respect to this class, and if so,
how it would proceed. Analogizing to Teamsters, the court did
note that a finding of liability at the first stage would result in
the following burdens and presumptions for each party during
whatever individual-relief proceedings may follow:
If plaintiffs in this case seek individual
relief for class members in this class action . . .
who can show they attempted to return to work
with or without an accommodation and if there is
a finding of liability, those individuals arguably
will be entitled to a presumption, which UPS can
rebut, that they have been discriminated against.
The burden will be on UPS to show that those
individuals are not entitled to individual relief; for
example, by demonstrating that an individual
could not perform a job even with an
accommodation. On the other hand, with respect
to . . . those employees who were absent from
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at 208 n.69; see also id. at 200 (suggesting inquiries into
whether class members are qualified, including whether they
can or need to be reasonably accommodated, would occur at the

work due to medical reasons and did not attempt
to return to work or otherwise seek an
accommodation, the burden arguably will be on
the individual to show that he or she was capable
of working with or without an accommodation
and that he or she would have attempted to return
to work. . . . It is not clear at this time whether the
class was intended to not only include individuals
who in fact attempted to return to work, but also
to include those employees who did not attempt to
return to work. At the remedial stage in the
proceedings if it has been determined that UPS
has a discriminatory policy in violation of the
ADA, the parties will need to brief whether those
who did not attempt to return to work are akin to
nonapplicants as contemplated by Teamsters and
should be included as members of the class. In
other words, it will need to be determined whether
the “applicant” versus “nonapplicant” distinction
is actually implicated in this case.
Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 200.
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second Teamsters stage).14

14

At certain points in its analysis, the District Court suggested
that whether plaintiffs were “qualified” under the ADA may be
relevant to its certification determination. See, e.g., Hohider,
243 F.R.D. at 206 (“Bates is instructive for this case . . . to the
extent that it is an example of a private-plaintiff Rule 23(b)(2)
ADA class action and to the extent that it recognized that, in
such cases, to maintain a class action, the named plaintiffs
needed to establish that at least one named plaintiff was
‘qualified’ in order to have statutory standing to bring a lawsuit
under the ADA.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 229 (recognizing
that “[s]ome courts . . . have required named plaintiffs—at least
in order to have standing to assert an ADA claim alleging an
illegal policy and to represent the class adequately—to establish
that they are qualified individuals within the meaning of the
ADA at the certification stage”). The court, however, does not
appear to have undertaken the inquiry. See id. at 218 n.82
(declining to address whether plaintiffs are “qualified” in its
Rule 23(a) commonality discussion, because “[a]t the class
certification stage, this issue really goes to the named plaintiffs’
typicality and adequacy to represent the class and to the
appropriateness of individual relief” and thus “will be addressed
in more detail” later in the analysis); id. at 226 (declining to
address “[t]he question whether plaintiffs are qualified
individuals under the ADA” in its typicality discussion, as that
question “more directly affects plaintiffs’ adequacy as class
representatives”); id. at 229–30 (reciting, in its Rule 23(a)
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The court recognized that, in the present case, some of
these “individual elements of a reasonable accommodation
claim” are not suitable for class treatment, as their resolution
would require inquiries too individualized and divergent with
respect to this class to meet the requirements of Rule 23. See id.
at 191 (noting “th[e] issue ‘whether a reasonable
accommodation is possible’ cuts against certification under the
Rule 23(a) prerequisites of commonality and typicality as well
as the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement that the defendant treated the
proposed class members on grounds generally applicable to the
class”). By the court’s analysis, however, these individualized
inquiries could be delayed until the second, “remedial” stage of
the Teamsters framework, and thus would not obstruct
certification of the first, “liability” stage, which would require
only proof of the existence of the alleged policies as UPS’s
“standard operating procedure.” See, e.g., id. at 231 (“It is
sufficient in order to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) for
the court to find that either UPS has acted on grounds generally
applicable to the class by engaging in the alleged de facto 100%
healed policy or by not engaging in the alleged de facto 100%
healed policy; by implementing its formal ADA compliance

adequacy-of-representation discussion, evidence regarding
plaintiffs’ status as “disabled” under the ADA and finding,
without discussion of plaintiffs’ status as “qualified,” “that the
evidence is sufficient for the court to determine for the purposes
of certification that plaintiffs are adequate to bring this lawsuit
and have statutory standing to sue under the ADA”).
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procedures in violation of the ADA, or by implementing them in
compliance with it; or by creating job classifications that are
designed without regard to essential job functions to preclude
anyone from returning to work who could not lift seventy
pounds, or by creating job classifications that are designed with
regard to essential job functions.”). Accordingly, the court
identified which of plaintiffs’ claims were premised on policies
whose existence could be proven on a classwide basis, see, e.g.,
id. at 222–23, and certified the class to pursue nonindividualized
relief with respect to those claims. See id. at 245 (“[W]ith
respect to the class claims, plaintiffs may seek appropriate
equitable relief including injunctive and declaratory relief and
monetary damages incidental to the requested injunctive or
declaratory relief. Plaintiffs, therefore, may be able to seek
back pay or other equitable relief for individual class members
if there is a protocol for identifying those monetary damages
which sets forth the objective standards to be utilized in
determining the amount of those damages in a way that does not
require additional hearings on individualized circumstances.”).
C.
The parties dispute whether the Teamsters evidentiary
framework is properly applied to the present case. This dispute
comprises two inquiries: whether the Teamsters framework, as
a general matter, can be imported from the Title VII context in
which it was promulgated and applied to pattern-or-practice
claims raised under the ADA; and if so, whether plaintiffs’
claims, when analyzed with this framework in mind, can be
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certified for class treatment.
If we assume, as plaintiffs contend and the District Court
found, that in light of 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) and Title VII
jurisprudence, the Teamsters framework can be used to analyze
pattern-or-practice claims brought as private-plaintiff class
actions under the ADA, this does not, in itself, resolve whether
the class action before us can go forward under the Teamsters
framework in a manner consistent with Rule 23. The Teamsters
framework was judicially promulgated as a method of proof for
pattern-or-practice claims brought by the government under
Title VII, as that statute authorizes—it provides a means by
which courts can assess whether a particular form of statutorily
prohibited discrimination exists, just as the McDonnell Douglas
framework does for individual claims of disparate treatment.
And, like the McDonnell Douglas framework, its importance
“lies, not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof
there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that
any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under
the Act.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358; see Bates v. UPS, 511
F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding that the
“burden-shifting protocol [of Teamsters] is . . . unnecessary”
when “[t]he fact to be uncovered by such a protocol—whether
the employer made an employment decision on a proscribed
basis . . . —is not in dispute,” and noting that the protocol, when
used to resolve this fact, becomes “moot after trial” and does not
substantively bear on a reviewing court’s assessment of
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“whether the evidence presented at trial supports a finding of
liability”); see also, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (“The prima facie case
method established in McDonnell Douglas was never intended
to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical question of
discrimination. Where the defendant has done everything that
would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out
a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no
longer relevant. The district court has before it all the evidence
it needs to decide whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d
Cir. 1984) (“The McDonnell Douglas formula is a tool that
enables the trial judge to sift through the evidence in an orderly
fashion to determine the ultimate question in the case—did the
defendant intentionally discriminate against the plaintiff. The
presumptions and the shifting burdens are merely an aid in
making that determination; they are not ends in themselves.”
(citation omitted)).
Thus, the Teamsters framework might assist a court’s
analysis of whether a defendant has engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination prohibited under Title VII and, if so,
to whom relief should be awarded. It is Title VII, however, that
defines the scope of prohibited discrimination and sets the
substantive boundaries within which the method of proof must
operate. So too with the ADA. Even if the Teamsters
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framework is recognized as an acceptable method of proof for
pattern-or-practice claims under the ADA, this determination
would not, by its own force, affect what patterns or practices
constitute discrimination prohibited by the statute. Nor would
the framework, once adopted, independently dictate what
substantive elements must meet the requirements of Rule 23 in
order to reach a classwide finding of unlawful discrimination
under that statute.
Here, the District Court adopted the Teamsters
framework to analyze plaintiffs’ ADA claims, and concluded it
could certify three of those claims for class treatment under the
first, “liability” stage of that framework. See Hohider, 243
F.R.D. at 208, 245. The court determined that, if plaintiffs are
able to prove the existence of the policies alleged in those
claims as UPS’s “standard operating procedure,” such proof,
with nothing more, would be sufficient to establish that UPS
engaged in a classwide pattern or practice of discrimination
prohibited under the ADA. See, e.g., id. at 231–32. The court
found that the individualized inquiries with respect to the class
could be delayed until the second Teamsters stage of
proceedings, which is devoted to questions of individual relief,
and would be unnecessary to the determinations made at the
first Teamsters stage. See id. at 229, 208 n.69 (“[U]nder the
pattern-or-practice framework, at the initial liability stage,
plaintiffs need not prove that each member of the class was a
qualified individual with a disability or individually entitled to
reasonable accommodation,” though “the individual elements
of a reasonable accommodation claim may be relevant at the
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second, remedial stage of proceedings if plaintiffs seek
individual relief on behalf of individual class members.”). By
the court’s analysis, because the existence of the policies can be
adjudicated on a classwide basis and plaintiffs need not prove
anything else to reach, at the first Teamsters stage, a finding of
liability and relief with respect to the class, the claims alleging
discrimination as a result of these policies may be certified
under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
The Teamsters framework alone, however, does not
justify this conclusion. Under this framework, plaintiffs would
have the burden of proving that UPS has adopted, as its
“standard operating procedure,” a pattern or practice of
discrimination prohibited under the ADA, see Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 336, and, if they carry this burden, the class would be
entitled to a finding of liability and relief. See id. at 361
(“Without any further evidence from the Government, a court’s
finding of a pattern or practice justifies an award of prospective
relief.”); Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876. The focus at this first stage
of proof is generally not “on individual hiring decisions, but on
a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking,” Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 360 n.46, and “the question of individual relief does not
arise until [the second Teamsters stage, after] it has been proved
[at the first stage] that the employer has followed an
employment policy of unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 361; see
Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876.
That the existence of the policies alleged by plaintiffs can
be adjudicated on a classwide basis, however, does not mean
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that these policies, if proven to exist, would amount to a
classwide showing of unlawful discrimination under the ADA.
And that the Teamsters framework contemplates a second stage
of proceedings where questions of individual relief may be
addressed, does not mean that all individualized inquiries with
respect to a given class can be delayed until that stage. Instead,
it is necessary to look to the ADA, the statutory basis for
plaintiffs’ claims, to assess what elements must be demonstrated
for the court to reach, at the first Teamsters stage, a
determination of unlawful discrimination and a finding of
classwide liability and relief. If those elements include
individualized inquiries that cannot be addressed in a manner
consistent with Rule 23, then the class cannot be certified. As
noted in Cooper, the elements necessary to establish a pattern or
practice of unlawful discrimination on behalf of a class may not
mirror those necessary to establish a valid individual claim of
discrimination, see 467 U.S. at 877–78, and so the fact that
individualized inquiries might preclude certification of class
members’ various individual claims of relief is not necessarily
dispositive of whether that class’s pattern-or-practice claim
satisfies Rule 23. It is the ADA, however, and not the
Teamsters evidentiary framework, that controls the substantive
assessment of what elements must be determined to prove a
pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination in this case. See
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499,
2512 (2007) (“Congress, as creator of federal statutory claims,
. . . has power to determine what must be proved to prevail on
the merits.”); cf. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-441, slip
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op. at 7, 8–9 n.3 (June 18, 2009) (noting that, in “decid[ing]
whether [the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)] authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim,”
“[o]ur inquiry . . . must focus on the text of the ADEA,” and
rejecting the notion that the Court may recognize such a claim
merely because it may believe “there is ‘nothing unfair or
impractical’ about hinging liability on whether ‘forbidden
motive . . . play[ed] a role in the employer’s decision,’” as “that
is a decision for Congress to make” and “[w]e must give effect
to Congress’ choice” (quoting id., slip op. at 2–3 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting))). We believe the District Court’s certification

analysis loses sight of this point. See, e.g., Hohider, 243 F.R.D.
at 155 (“The court ultimately concludes . . . that . . . plaintiffs’
claims are subject to the [Teamsters] pattern-or-practice
framework of proof . . . , which does not require an
individualized inquiry at the liability stage adjudicating whether
a company-wide policy is unlawful under the discrimination
statutes . . . .”); id. at 208 (“[T]his court concludes that plaintiffs
in this case are not barred from proceeding pursuant to the
pattern-or-practice framework set forth in Teamsters because
they are private plaintiffs or because they are litigating claims
pursuant to the ADA and not Title VII. Plaintiffs, therefore,
will be allowed to litigate their pattern-or-practice claims for
injunctive relief pursuant to the elements of a prima facie case
set forth in Teamsters and will not be required to make out the
elements for an individual ADA claim if some or all of their
claims are certified for declaratory and injunctive relief.”); id.
at 226 n.91 (“Defendant’s arguments that individualized issues
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predominate and each named plaintiff’s claim implicates unique
defenses fail in light of the court’s finding that plaintiffs can
litigate these claims challenging alleged company-wide policies
pursuant to the [Teamsters] pattern-or-practice framework.”).
To the extent the District Court relied upon the Teamsters
method of proof to reach a certification decision incompatible
with the substantive requirements of the ADA, it abused its
discretion. See Oscar Private Equity, 487 F.3d at 264 (“A
district court that premises its legal analysis on an erroneous
understanding of the governing law has abused its discretion.”);
see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (prohibiting
the use of federal rules of practice and procedure, including the
class action mechanism provided for by Rule 23, to “abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right”); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997).
IV.
Having reviewed plaintiffs’ claims in light of the
substantive requirements of the ADA, we find those claims
cannot be adjudicated within the parameters of Rule 23 such
that a determination of classwide liability and relief can be
reached. Rather, establishing the unlawful discrimination
alleged by plaintiffs would require determining whether class
members are “qualified” under the ADA, an assessment that
encompasses inquiries acknowledged by the District Court to be
too individualized and divergent with respect to this class to
warrant certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). Contrary to
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the court’s determination otherwise, the Teamsters framework
cannot, by its own force, cure this flaw in the class.
Accordingly, the court’s grant of class certification was an
abuse of discretion.
A.
Title I of the ADA provides, as a general rule, that “[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual
with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8).
Title I enumerates specific examples of conduct that
would constitute discrimination prohibited under the statute.
See id. § 12112(b). The three class claims that have been
certified, according to the District Court, all “implicate the
[ADA’s] prohibition against discrimination in the form of
failure to make reasonable accommodations.” Hohider, 243
F.R.D. at 187. Namely, the ADA specifies that one way a
covered entity can engage in unlawful discrimination under the
statute is by
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to
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the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or (B) denying employment opportunities
to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if
such denial is based on the need of such covered
entity to make reasonable accommodation to the
physical or mental impairments of the employee
or applicant.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B).15
In construing § 12112(b)(5), we have held that, for a

15

As the District Court noted, plaintiffs “characterize each of
their reasonable accommodation policies claims as pattern-orpractice variants of a ‘failure to make a reasonable
accommodation’ claim that an individual plaintiff could bring
under the ADA in an individual lawsuit. These claims challenge
UPS’s alleged company-wide policies of non-accommodation
in violation of the ADA.” Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 154. The
court did not address whether these claims can be understood as
falling under another discrimination provision under the ADA
and, on appeal, the parties do not dispute this characterization of
the claims.
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covered entity to be found liable for discrimination on the basis
of failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must prove “‘(1) he is
a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer;
and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment
decision as a result of discrimination’ . . . [which] in this context
include[s] refusing to make reasonable accommodations for a
plaintiff’s disabilities.” Williams v. Phila. Housing Auth. Police
Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)). We
have also recognized that, although the ADA itself does not
mention an “interactive process” with respect to reasonable
accommodations,
[t]he ADA’s regulations state that: “To determine
the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may
be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an
informal, interactive process with the qualified
individual with a disability in need of
accommodation. This process should identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability
and the potential reasonable accommodations that
could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(3). Similarly, the EEOC’s interpretive
guidelines provide that: “Once a qualified
individual with a disability has requested
provision of a reasonable accommodation, the
employer must make a reasonable effort to
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determine the appropriate accommodation. The
appropriate reasonable accommodation is best
determined through a flexible, interactive process
that involves both the employer and the qualified
individual with a disability.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,
App. § 1630.9 at 359.
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 311 (alterations in original omitted); see
Williams, 380 F.3d at 771. In handling a disabled employee’s
request for a reasonable accommodation, “both parties
[employers and employees] have a duty to assist in the search
for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good
faith.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 312 (quoting Mengine v. Runyon,
114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997)). “The interactive process
does not dictate that any particular concession must be made by
the employer; nor does the process remove the employee’s
burden of showing that a particular accommodation rejected by
the employer would have made the employee qualified to
perform the job’s essential functions. All the interactive process
requires is that employers make a good-faith effort to seek
accommodations.” Id. at 317 (citation omitted). Accordingly,
we have found that
[a]n employee can demonstrate that an employer
breached its duty to provide reasonable
accommodations because it failed to engage in
good faith in the interactive process by showing
that: “1) the employer knew about the employee’s
disability; 2) the employee requested
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accommodations or assistance for his or her
disability; 3) the employer did not make a good
faith effort to assist the employee in seeking
accommodations; and 4) the employee could have
been reasonably accommodated but for the
employer’s lack of good faith.”
Williams, 380 F.3d at 772 (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319–20);
see also Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting the same test from Taylor for what “a disabled
employee must demonstrate” “to show that an employer has
violated its duty to engage in the interactive process”). Under
the theory of liability advanced by plaintiffs and certified by the
District Court, the policies alleged in plaintiffs’ claims, if
proven to exist, evidence UPS’s “systematic failures to engage
in the mandatory interactive process in good faith and to make
reasonable accommodations,” Pls.’ Br. 3 (citing Hohider &
DiPaolo Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6–7, 11; Branum Compl. ¶¶ 13,
15–16)16 —a violation of UPS’s obligation, as a covered entity
16

According to the court,
[plaintiffs’] reasonable accommodation policies
claims can be further distinguished [from one
another]. Plaintiffs’ principal allegation appears
to be that UPS enforces an unwritten, de facto
“100% healed” return-to-work policy (the “100%
healed policy claim”). Plaintiffs argue that the
100% healed policy claim, if proven, constitutes
a per se violation of the ADA’s requirements
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under the ADA, to reasonably accommodate otherwise qualified
individuals with disabilities.17
relating to the making of reasonable
accommodations. That is, plaintiffs argue that at
the merits stage of this litigation, with respect to
the 100% healed policy claim, if plaintiffs prove
the existence of the alleged 100% healed policy,
the policy could be declared unlawful and
appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief could
flow from that determination. Plaintiffs’ other
reasonable accommodation policies claims appear
primarily to be alleging violations of the ADA as
a result of the implementation of those policies
and not as per se violations.
Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 153.
17

Plaintiffs also assert UPS’s policies, if proven to exist,
would demonstrate that UPS “regards as disabled” all
individuals against whom those policies are applied, thereby
proving “disability” under the ADA on a classwide basis. See
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “[t]he term ‘disability’ .
. . with respect to an individual” as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment”). We held
in Williams that “‘regarded as’ employees under the ADA are
entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same way as are
those who are actually disabled.” 380 F.3d at 775.
48

We note that, during the pendency of this appeal, the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was signed into law,
becoming effective January 1, 2009. See Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705
note). The ADAAA amends the ADA in important respects,
particularly with regard to the definition and construction of
“disability” under the statute. For instance, while the general
definition of “disability” in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) retains largely
the same language, the ADAAA adds a provision addressing the
intended scope of the “regarded as” prong of that definition. It
specifies that “[a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action
prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(A)); see also id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(B)) (“[The ‘regarded as’ prong of § 12102(1)] shall
not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A
transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or
expected duration of 6 months or less.”). The ADAAA also
makes clear that “[a] covered entity under [Title I of the ADA]
. . . need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a
reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to
an individual who meets the definition of disability in [§
12102(1)] solely under [the ‘regarded as’ prong] of such
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section.” Id. § 6(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3558 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12201(h)).
The parties dispute the applicability and effect of the
ADAAA with respect to the class certified by the District Court.
Plaintiffs contend the class claims should be evaluated under the
ADA as amended by the ADAAA, and that these amendments
only make the claims more amenable to class treatment. UPS
objects to such application of the ADAAA as impermissibly
retroactive. Furthermore, UPS contends the ADAAA eliminates
any entitlement to reasonable accommodation that plaintiffs
asserting “disability” under the ADA solely under the “regarded
as” prong may have previously enjoyed. See id. Thus,
according to UPS, if the ADAAA were found to apply, its
amendments would effectively remove any claim to relief the
class may have had.
In light of our analysis infra, we need not reach this
dispute. As we will discuss, plaintiffs’ inability to demonstrate
on a classwide basis that all class members are “qualified” under
the ADA renders certification of the class improper. The
ADAAA is silent as to this statutory element, neither removing
it nor otherwise purporting to amend its definition or
construction. See, e.g., id. § 5(a), 122 Stat. at 3557 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112) (amending § 12112(a) and (b)’s
prohibition of discrimination against a “qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual” to
prohibit discrimination against a “qualified individual on the
basis of disability”). Accordingly, even if we were to apply the
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B.
As the District Court recognized, were the liability
standards outlined above to control the adjudication of
plaintiffs’ claims, class certification would be improper. For a
plaintiff to be “qualified” under the ADA, he “must ‘satisf[y]
the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the
appropriate educational background, employment experience,
skills, licenses, etc.’ and, [he] must be able to ‘perform the
essential functions of the position held or desired, with or
without reasonable accommodations.’” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 311
(first alteration in original) (quoting Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc.,
134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). The class, as defined,
contains no unifying or limiting criteria—with respect to
employment positions held or desired, for instance, or
conditions suffered, or accommodations sought—that
potentially would permit classwide evaluation of whether each
member of the class is “qualified” and thus can perform the

ADAAA to plaintiffs’ claims in the manner they desire, it would
not affect our determination that the class was improperly
certified. As such, we decline to resolve whether the ADAAA
and its amendments apply to plaintiffs’ claims. For the sake of
consistency with the District Court’s analysis, we have cited to
the pre-ADAAA version of the ADA in our analysis. This does
not reflect any determination regarding the applicability of the
ADAAA to plaintiffs’ claims.
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essential functions of a given job with or without reasonable
accommodation. Nor does proof of the existence of the policies
alleged in plaintiffs’ claims resolve these inquiries. Rather,
analysis of the ADA’s “qualified” standard, if necessary to a
determination of classwide liability against UPS, would render
plaintiffs’ claims unsuitable for certification under Rule 23(a)
and (b)(2). See Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 191.
The District Court found, however, that it could
adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims and reach a finding of classwide
liability and relief without undertaking individualized inquiries
into qualification (and thus reasonable accommodation) with
respect to the class. As discussed, the court premised this
determination on its adoption of the Teamsters evidentiary
framework. According to the court, “the trilogy of decisions
comprised of Franks, Teamsters, and Cooper makes clear that
the elements of proof for plaintiffs proceeding to litigate class
claims alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination pursuant
to the Teamsters framework are distinct from the elements of
proof in an individual discrimination case.” Id. at 204. Since
“[p]laintiffs . . . will be allowed to litigate their pattern-orpractice claims for injunctive relief pursuant to the elements of
a prima facie case set forth in Teamsters,” the court concluded
they “will not be required to make out the elements for an
individual ADA claim if some or all of their claims are certified
for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. at 208. By the District
Court’s analysis, the elements of qualification and reasonable
accommodation are among those that, while perhaps necessary
to uncovering “the reason for a particular employment decision”
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and thus resolving an individual claim of discrimination under
the ADA, are not likewise necessary to determining at the first
Teamsters stage whether an employer has engaged in a “‘pattern
of discriminatory decisionmaking’” prohibited under that
statute. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S.
at 360 n.46); see id. at 875–76 (contrasting the McDonnell
Douglas framework for individual claims of discrimination and
the Teamsters framework for pattern-or-practice claims). In
support of this analysis, plaintiffs point to Franks and
Teamsters, where inquiry into whether individual class
members were actual victims of discrimination—including
whether each class member was qualified for the job
sought—was reserved for the second stage of proceedings, and
did not need to be addressed for a finding of classwide liability
and relief to be reached. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 369
n.53; Franks, 424 U.S. at 772–73. Plaintiffs reason that, since
“[i]t is axiomatic . . . that proof of class member ‘qualification’
in a Title VII class action is reserved for the remedial phase of
the litigation,” and since “proving ‘qualification’ is not
measurably different in an ADA class action than in a Title VII
one,” under both statutes “this element of proof is harmonious
with the Teamsters framework because it is determined only
after proving the existence of systemic discrimination.” Pls.’
Br. 36.
We disagree with this line of reasoning. As noted, the
ADA, and not the Teamsters method of proof, dictates what
substantive elements are necessary to reach a determination that
UPS has engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful
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discrimination, and to what extent these elements may overlap
with those necessary to an individual claim of discrimination.
That the adjudication of a Title VII class action under the
Teamsters framework may not require a showing of each class
member’s qualification to reach a finding of unlawful
discrimination, does not mean that the same conclusion applies
in the ADA context. Rather, “we ‘must be careful not to apply
rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without
careful and critical examination.’” Gross, No. 08-441, slip op.
at 6 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147,
1153 (2008)); see also id., slip op. at 7 n.2 (concluding, in light
of such examination, that “the textual differences between Title
VII and the ADEA . . . prevent us from applying [the Title VII
mixed-motives framework discussed in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90 (2003),] to federal age discrimination claims”). The

ADA and Title VII, by their plain language, do not treat the
qualification inquiry equivalently in their respective statutory
schemes, a substantive distinction the District Court failed to
incorporate into its certification analysis. Title VII prohibits
covered employers from discriminating against “any individual
. . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).18 This statutory

18

Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
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provision does not speak to qualification, but protects all
individuals from discrimination motivated by the immutable
characteristics specified in the statute. Courts have undertaken
inquiry into whether a plaintiff is qualified in the Title VII
context to evaluate “the reason for a particular employment
decision” in an individual discrimination case, Cooper, 467 U.S.
at 876—namely, to assess, under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, whether a plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence
to raise an inference of discriminatory treatment and to shift

discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 2000e-2(m) clarifies that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m).
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onto the defendant the burden of producing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358
n.44 (“Although the McDonnell Douglas formula does not
require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand that the
alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did
not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on
which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a
vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the
refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create
an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.”).
Thus, inquiry into an individual’s employment qualifications
may be integral to a court’s assessment of whether
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin has occurred; it is not likewise necessary to a
determination of whether such discrimination against that
individual, once proven to have occurred, is unlawful under the
statute.
The ADA does not define the scope of its protections and
prohibitions as broadly as Title VII. As noted, Title I of the
ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities because of their
disabilities, a prohibition that includes failing to reasonably
accommodate such individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a),
(b)(5). In contrast to Title VII, it does not prohibit
discrimination against any individual on the basis of disability,
but, as a general rule, only protects from discrimination those
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disabled individuals who are able to perform, with or without
reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of the job
they hold or desire. See Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440
F.3d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress enacted the ADA in
1990 in an effort to prevent otherwise qualified individuals from
being discriminated against in employment based on disability.”
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630)); Gaul, 134 F.3d at 579 (same); see
also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806
(1999) (characterizing an ADA plaintiff’s “burden of proving
that she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’—that is, a
person ‘who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions’ of her job”—as “an essential
element of her ADA case” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)));
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir.
1998) (recognizing that, generally speaking, “Title I of the ADA
restricts the ability to sue under its provisions to a ‘qualified
individual with a disability’”); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d
461, 465 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases and finding
that, since “the ADA’s proscription against employment
discrimination protects only ‘qualified individual[s] with a
disability’ . . . , the elements of a plaintiff's prima facie showing
[of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework]
must . . . include a showing that the plaintiff is a member of the
protected class—i.e., a ‘qualified individual with a disability’”
(first alteration in original)).19 As under Title VII, inquiry into
19

Cf. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting
“discriminat[ion] against any individual because such individual
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whether a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under the
ADA is qualified for the employment in question may be
relevant to assessing whether that plaintiff has offered evidence
sufficient to give rise to an inference that the employer
discriminated against him on the basis of a statutorily protected
characteristic. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se.
Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667–68 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The McDonnell
Douglas Title VII burden shifting rules apply to claims of
discriminatory treatment under the ADA.”); Matczak v.

has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter
or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.”). Accordingly, “[u]nlike a plaintiff
in an ADA discrimination case, a plaintiff in an ADA retaliation
case need not establish that he is a ‘qualified individual with a
disability.’” Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 (3d
Cir. 1997). “That conclusion follows inexorably from the
unambiguous text of the ADA. The Act not only applies to
those who are protected because they are ‘disabled’ as defined
therein. It also ‘protects “any individual” who has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or who has made a
charge under the ADA. This differs from the scope of the ADA
disability discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), which
may be invoked only by a “qualified individual with a
disability.”’” Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d
183, 188 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 502 (some
citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
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Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d Cir.
1997); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3
(2003). Unlike Title VII, however, the ADA explicitly
incorporates this inquiry into its definition of prohibited
discrimination, and thus generally requires evaluation of
whether a disabled individual is “qualified” as defined under the
statute to determine not only whether discrimination on the
basis of disability has occurred, but more fundamentally,
whether such discrimination against that individual is unlawful.
Analysis of plaintiffs’ particular theories of
discrimination under the ADA bears out this general distinction
between the statutes. These theories all require inquiry into
whether class members are “qualified”—which includes
whether they can or need to be reasonably
accommodated—before a classwide determination of unlawful
discrimination, as contemplated at the first Teamsters stage, can
be reached. By the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5),
whether UPS unlawfully discriminated against employees by
failing to grant reasonable accommodations cannot be
determined without assessing whether those employees are
“otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities.” If a disabled
employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job he
seeks or desires with or without an accommodation that is
reasonable and that does not impose an undue hardship on the
employer, then under the terms of the ADA, the employee is not
entitled to an accommodation and the employer does not
“discriminate” against the employee in failing to grant him one.
See, e.g., Williams, 380 F.3d at 771 (“[A] failure to make a
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reasonable accommodation for a disabled and qualified
employee constitutes discrimination under the ADA.” (citing
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306)).
The same holds true for plaintiffs’ interactive-process
theory of discrimination. Under that theory, it may be easier to
envision a classwide claim of discriminatory treatment: that
UPS, by adopting and implementing the policies alleged by
plaintiffs, systematically refuses to engage in any sort of
interactive process with employees who are seeking to return to
work after medical leave but are restricted in their ability to
perform their former job. Rather than assessing whatever
individual limitations these employees may have and
determining what accommodations, if any, may be reasonable
and effective in addressing those limitations, UPS, as a matter
of blanket policy, simply refuses to employ them. Under this
theory of discrimination, UPS’s systematic denial of
individualized consideration, in itself, constitutes a violation of
the ADA, and can be proven without any showing that a given
individual was “qualified” under that statute.
We have recognized that “[w]hen the interactive process
works well, it furthers the purposes of . . . the ADA.” Mengine,
114 F.3d at 420; see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177
F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the “general logic of the
ADA . . . requires an interactive relationship between employer
and employee, and . . . an individualized evaluation of
employees’ impairments”). Engaging in a good-faith interactive
process may “not only lead to identifying a specific
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accommodation that will allow a disabled employee to continue
to function as a dignified and valued employee, it may also help
sensitize the employer to the needs and worth of the disabled
person,” Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, 334 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2003), and disabuse the employer of any misperceptions it
may have of the employee’s condition and qualification for
employment. See Pathmark Stores, 177 F.3d at 192–94
(acknowledging, in its discussion of “regarded as” disability
under the ADA, that “the ADA has as a major purpose the
protection of individuals who are subject to stereotypes about
their abilities,” and promulgating a standard for assessing an
employer’s liability in the “regarded as” context that encourages
individualized consideration and “communication between
employer and employee, in the same way that the interactive
process for determining reasonable accommodations does”).
While, for these reasons, we have admonished
“employers [to] take seriously the interactive process,”
Williams, 380 F.3d at 772 n.16, we have not found an
employer’s failure to engage in that process and grant an
employee individualized consideration, with nothing more,
amounts to discrimination prohibited under the ADA. Rather,
if the employee “is not a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA,
. . . [the employer’s] alleged failure to investigate into
reasonable accommodation is unimportant.” Gaul, 134 F.3d at
581; see Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420 (“[W]here a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate ‘reasonable accommodation,’ the employer’s lack
of investigation into reasonable accommodation is
unimportant.” (alteration in original) (quoting Willis v.
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Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997))); Donahue
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2000)
(finding the same under the Rehabilitation Act, and rejecting the
argument that an employer’s “failure to engage in good faith in
the interactive process was alone sufficient to defeat summary
judgment and might even give rise to an independent cause of
action”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (characterizing the
interactive process potentially required under the ADA as one
between an employer and a “qualified individual with a
disability”). “If it turns out there is no job which the worker
(with or without accommodation) is capable of performing, then
the company cannot be held liable for an ADA . . . violation.”
Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420; see Williams, 380 F.3d at 772
(“[B]ecause employers have a duty to help the disabled
employee devise accommodations, an employer who acts in bad
faith in the interactive process will be liable if the jury can
reasonably conclude that the employee would have been able to
perform the job with accommodations.” (quoting Donahue, 224
F.3d at 234–35)); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317, 318 n.9 (“The
interactive process does not . . . remove the employee’s burden
of showing that a particular accommodation rejected by the
employer would have made the employee qualified to perform
the job’s essential functions,” and “the process is not necessary
in cases where accommodation is impossible.”); Mengine, 114
F.3d at 420 (“The ADA, as far as we are aware, is not intended
to punish employers for behaving callously if, in fact, no
accommodation for the employee’s disability could reasonably
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have been made.” (quoting Willis, 108 F.3d at 285)).20

20

See also, e.g., Battle v. UPS, 438 F.3d 856, 864 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Under the ADA, if no reasonable accommodation is
available, an employer is not liable for failing to engage in a
good-faith interactive process.”); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Failure to engage in
th[e] ‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief
. . . if the employer can show that no reasonable accommodation
was possible. Therefore, we ordinarily look first to whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the availability
of a reasonable accommodation, and if it is clear that no
reasonable accommodation was available, we stop there.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d
48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Although we have noted that there
may be situations in which failure to engage in the process
would constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommodation
that amounts to a violation of the ADA, we also consider such
an omission of no moment if the record forecloses a finding that
the plaintiff could perform the duties of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodation.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105,
1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (collecting cases and “hold[ing]
that employers, who fail to engage in the interactive process in
good faith, face liability for the remedies imposed by the statute
if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible”),
vacated in part on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
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Accordingly, while “an employer who fails to engage in
the interactive process runs a serious risk that it will erroneously
overlook an opportunity to accommodate a statutorily disabled
employee, and thereby violate the ADA,” Deane v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), failure
to engage in the interactive process, in itself, does not constitute
such a violation. See Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d
356, 359 (3d Cir. 2002); Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420–21; see also
Pathmark Stores, 177 F.3d at 193 (noting that “an employer
[who acts on the belief that a perceived disability inherently
precludes performance of the essential functions of a job, with
or without accommodation] is failing to make an individualized
determination, as the ADA requires, and thus acts at its peril,”
as “the employer must be correct about the affected employee’s
ability to perform the job in order to avoid liability”). This is
consistent with the plain language of the ADA, which only
characterizes as unlawful discrimination an employer’s failure
to reasonably accommodate an “otherwise qualified individual”
when that accommodation does not impose an undue hardship,
and which does not speak directly to the process employers
should undertake in doing so. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see
also Williams, 380 F.3d at 771 (“‘The ADA itself does not refer

banc) (“Even if [the employer] failed to fulfill its interactive
obligations to help secure a reassignment position, [the
employee] will not be entitled to recovery unless he can also
show that a reasonable accommodation was possible and would
have led to a reassignment position.”).
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to the interactive process,’ but does require employers to ‘make
reasonable accommodations’ under some circumstances for
qualified individuals.” (quoting Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 359)).
In the same vein as their interactive-process theory of
discrimination, “plaintiffs argue that 100% healed policies are
per se unlawful under the ADA” because they inherently deny
employees individualized consideration and reasonable
accommodation.21 Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 216. Under this
theory, according to plaintiffs, “if they can establish the
existence of the alleged 100% healed policy, no further proof
would be needed to establish liability under the ADA.” Id.
We have not previously addressed whether “100%
healed” policies constitute per se discrimination under the ADA,
and we need not do so here. Even if we were to adopt that
theory, we do not believe plaintiffs can reach a determination of
unlawfulness under the ADA by proving only the existence of

21

The Ninth Circuit has held “‘100% healed’ policies are per
se violations of the ADA. A ‘100% healed’ or ‘fully healed’
policy discriminates against qualified individuals with
disabilities because such a policy permits employers to
substitute a determination of whether a qualified individual is
‘100% healed’ from their injury for the required individual
assessment whether the qualified individual is able to perform
the essential functions of his or her job either with or without
accommodation.” McGregor v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
187 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).
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a “100% healed” policy, without any inquiry into whether that
policy has been used to discriminate against individuals
protected by the ADA from such discrimination. Cf. Henderson
v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding
plaintiff’s argument that a “‘100% healed’ rule was a per se
violation of the ADA” because it denied her “individual
assessment for her position” impermissibly “foreshorten[ed] the
inquiry” necessary under the ADA, as such policies do not
violate the ADA when applied to individuals not “disabled”
under the statute). Rather, by our understanding, such a policy
could be per se violative of the ADA because, when it is applied
against qualified individuals with disabilities, it would, by its
very terms, discriminate against those protected individuals on
the basis of their disabilities, systematically denying them the
reasonable accommodations to which they are entitled and
excluding them from employment for which they are otherwise
qualified. Thus, as with an employer’s blanket refusal to
engage in an interactive process with its employees, an
employer’s “100% healed” policy, even if deemed per se
discriminatory, cannot give rise to a finding of liability and
relief under the ADA without the statutorily required inquiry
into whether those affected by policy are disabled and able to
perform the essential functions of the jobs they seek or desire
with or without reasonable accommodation. See, e.g.,
Warmsley v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 308 F. Supp. 2d 114,
119–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the existence of a “100%
healed” policy per se satisfies plaintiff’s showing of
discrimination on the basis of disability, but also requiring that
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plaintiff be “disabled” and “otherwise qualified” to have an
ADA claim); Hammer v. Bd. of Educ., 955 F. Supp. 921, 927
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying plaintiff’s request for summary
judgment with respect to the claim that defendant “committed
a per se violation of the ADA” by implementing an alleged “no
work restrictions” policy, in part because “there [wa]s a genuine
question of fact regarding whether or not plaintiff was capable
of performing the essential functions of his job either with or
without reasonable accommodation”); Norris v. Allied-Sysco
Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(discussing different potential interpretations of the per se
theory of liability under the ADA, all of which contemplate that
“the employee could have been reasonably accommodated
(without undue hardship) in a manner contrary to the [per se
discriminatory] policy but was not” in order to find that the
“employer violates the ADA” by implementing the policy);
Hutchinson v. UPS, 883 F. Supp. 379, 397–98 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (finding that a “100% healed” policy is per se
discriminatory, but that plaintiff could not assert this per se
claim because she was not “disabled” and thus lacked standing
to sue under the ADA); see also McGregor v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that, under the per se theory, “[a] ‘100% healed’ . .
. policy discriminates against qualified individuals with
disabilities” because of the “individual assessment” it denies
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those “qualified individual[s]” (emphasis added)).22
C.
Based on this analysis of plaintiffs’ claims under the
ADA, assessment of whether class members are “qualified” is
necessary to determine whether UPS has engaged in a pattern or
practice of unlawful discrimination and thus can be held liable
for violating the ADA with respect to the class. As discussed,
in this case the ADA’s “qualified” standard cannot be evaluated
on a classwide basis in a manner consistent with Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2); applying the Teamsters evidentiary framework to
plaintiffs’ claims does not remove this impediment to
certification, even if all that is considered is the first, “liability”
stage of that framework. See Teamsters 431 U.S. at 359–60
n.45, 361 (noting that the “liability” stage of the framework
contemplates a “finding of a pattern or practice [of unlawful
discrimination that] change[s] the position of the employer to
that of a proved wrongdoer” and that “[w]ithout any further
evidence . . . justifies an award of prospective relief”). Because

22

Cf. Bates, 511 F.3d at 989, 994 (finding, in its review of a
liability determination under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) in a
private-plaintiff ADA class action, that “[b]efore an employee
can challenge an employer’s [facially discriminatory]
qualification standard, . . . an employee must first prove that he
is a ‘qualified individual’ within the meaning of the ADA,” and
remanding for proper consideration of qualification and
reasonable accommodation).
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the statutorily required inquiry into qualification is incompatible
with the requirements of Rule 23 in this case, and because
plaintiffs cannot adjudicate their claims and requested relief
without it, the class cannot be certified. See Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
The District Court neglected to incorporate this
substantive evaluation of the ADA into its application of the
Teamsters framework to plaintiffs’ claims. In its analysis, the
court acknowledged that “[f]rom [our case law], it can be
inferred that merely showing that an employer has failed to
engage in the interactive process is not sufficient to recover
under the ADA for a failure to make a reasonable
accommodation claim, although it might bear on the proof of
such a claim.” Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 191. It also recognized
that “none [of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs in support of
their per se theory of discrimination] are directly on point for
this case where plaintiffs . . . seek to proceed in a class action”
and “where the parties . . . dispute whether the named plaintiffs
and putative class members are qualified individuals under the
ADA.” Id. at 218. The court found, however, that since
Teamsters applied, it did not need to address these substantive
uncertainties in its analysis—it could certify for class treatment
plaintiffs’ interactive-process theory of discrimination without
resolving whether failure in the process itself gives rise to
liability, and it did not need to “assess the merits of plaintiffs’
argument that 100% healed policies are per se violations of the
ADA. It is enough for the court to find that this issue presents
a common issue of law to further support the finding that the
69

Rule 23(a) commonality requirement is met in this case with
respect to plaintiffs’ 100% policy claim.” Id.
Evaluation of what substantive elements are necessary to
prove plaintiffs’ theories of discrimination touches upon the
merits of their claims. It is also critical to the class certification
analysis in this case, and is thus properly undertaken at this
stage. “Because the decision whether to certify a class ‘requires
a thorough examination of the factual and legal allegations,’ the
court’s rigorous analysis may include a ‘preliminary inquiry
into the merits,’ and the court may ‘consider the substantive
elements of the plaintiffs’ case in order to envision the form that
a trial on those issues would take.’” In re Hydrogen Peroxide,
552 F.3d at 317 (citations omitted) (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d
at 166, 168). “An overlap between a class certification
requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to
resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether
a class certification requirement is met.” Id. at 316. Rather,
“the court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to
class certification, even if they overlap with the
merits—including disputes touching on elements of the cause of
action.” Id. at 307; see also id. at 319 (“A critical need is to
determine how the case will be tried.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
23 advisory committee’s note, 2003 Amendments)).
Here, the District Court found plaintiffs’ claims could be
adjudicated under the Teamsters evidentiary framework. To
envision the form that a trial on these claims would take under
this framework and to determine if the trial would be suitable
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for class treatment, it was necessary for the court to evaluate
what substantive elements must be addressed to determine
whether UPS engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful
discrimination. While it did not need to resolve, for instance,
whether UPS’s alleged “100% healed” policy amounts to a per
se violation of the ADA, it did need to determine what elements
plaintiffs would have to prove under that theory to reach a
finding of liability and relief, and then assess whether this proof
can be made within the parameters of Rule 23. Noting that the
viability of the per se theory would affect all class members
alleging discrimination on the basis of the “100% healed”
policy, without addressing whether in this case the theory can
be adjudicated in a manner consistent with Rule 23, is not a
sufficiently rigorous analysis to support certification. See id. at
326 (“We emphasize that ‘[a]ctual, not presumed, conformance’
with the Rule 23 requirements is essential.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 167)); see also Falcon,
457 U.S. at 160.23

23

The District Court’s treatment of the ADA’s “disability”
requirement suffers from the same analytical deficiency. As
noted, plaintiffs assert that UPS, by operation of its
discriminatory policies, “regards as disabled” all class members.
UPS contends plaintiffs’ “regarded as” theory cannot be proven
on a classwide basis in this case, but rather, like the ADA’s
“qualified” standard, would entail individualized inquiries too
extensive and divergent to meet Rule 23’s requirements.
In its certification analysis, the District Court recognized
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that “[w]hether plaintiffs can prove their ‘regarded as’ theory of
discrimination in this case with respect to the 100% healed
policy and the other policies in the lawsuit that are certified . .
. presents an additional common issue in this case.” Hohider,
243 F.R.D. at 220. It also found that “[t]he actions of UPS with
respect to [each named plaintiff] implicate the policies in issue
and if at the merits stage they are proven to exist would
implicate that [each named plaintiff] was regarded as disabled.”
Id. at 229–30. Identifying the “regarded as” theory of disability
as one common to the class and applicable to its named
representatives, however, does not establish that the theory can
be proven on a classwide basis—namely, that proof of the
existence of the policies alleged in the class claims would result
in a common finding of disabled status with respect to every
potential class member. In fact, the court seems to undermine
such a conclusion in its analysis of plaintiffs’ proposed class
definition, choosing to remove from that definition the
requirement that class members be “disabled” under the ADA
due to the number of individualized inquiries such a requirement
may entail with respect to the class. See id. at 209.
As we find the individualized inquiries presented by the
ADA’s “qualified” standard in this case render class
certification of plaintiffs’ claims and relief improper, we need
not resolve this question. For the reasons discussed supra,
however, the District Court should have. Instead of fully
assessing whether the element of disability, necessary to a
determination of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, could
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In certifying plaintiffs’ claims, the District Court
concluded the elements of qualification and reasonable
accommodation were unnecessary to the adjudication of the
claims and relief certified for class treatment. The court based
this conclusion solely on its understanding of the Teamsters
method of proof. It did not adequately consider whether the
manner in which it applied this evidentiary framework to
plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination was supported by the ADA,
the statutory basis for those claims. Namely, the court did not
address whether, under the ADA, an employer’s failure to
engage in an interactive process with its employees, or its
implementation of a “100% healed” policy, can amount to
unlawful discrimination without a showing that this conduct
affected “otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities.” See
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). Instead, the court relied on the
Teamsters evidentiary framework to excise these inquiries from
its certification analysis, while neglecting to reconcile whether
the consequences of that analysis were substantively compatible
with the ADA. Such reliance was erroneous, and resulted in the
improper grant of certification to the class.

be adjudicated in a manner consistent with Rule 23, the court
ended its analysis at the recognition that all plaintiffs allege the
same general theory of disability. Such analysis does not meet
the level of rigor necessary to support certification.
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V.
In addition to the individualized inquiries necessary to
adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims, UPS contends the nature of the
relief sought by plaintiffs renders the class ineligible for
certification under Rule 23(b)(2). As noted, Rule 23(b)(2) is
intended for classes where “final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The advisory
committee’s 1966 note to Rule 23(b)(2) specifies that “[t]he
subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money
damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note,
1966 Amendment. According to UPS, plaintiffs’ requests for
monetary relief—in the form of back pay and compensatory and
punitive damages—predominate over the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought, in contravention of Rule 23(b)(2). As
the District Court acknowledged, we have not yet spoken on
how the predominance of monetary relief in the Rule 23(b)(2)
context should be measured and our sister circuits are split on
that question, with some adopting the “incidental damages”
standard set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.
1998), and others opting for a more discretionary, “ad hoc
balancing” approach such as that used by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
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R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).24 The court predicted

24

In Allison, the Fifth Circuit held that “monetary relief
predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to
requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” 151 F.3d at 415.
The Fifth Circuit elaborated:
By incidental, we mean damages that flow
directly from liability to the class as a whole on
the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or
declaratory relief. Ideally, incidental damages
should be only those to which class members
automatically would be entitled once liability to
the class (or subclass) as a whole is established.
That is, the recovery of incidental damages should
typically be concomitant with, not merely
consequential to, class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief. Moreover, such damages
should at least be capable of computation by
means of objective standards and not dependent in
any significant way on the intangible, subjective
differences of each class member’s circumstances.
Liability for incidental damages should not
require additional hearings to resolve the
disparate merits of each individual’s case; it
should neither introduce new and substantial legal
or factual issues, nor entail complex
individualized determinations. Thus, incidental
damages will, by definition, be more in the nature
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of a group remedy, consistent with the forms of
relief intended for (b)(2) class actions.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Robinson, the Second Circuit “decline[d] to adopt the
incidental damages approach set out by the Fifth Circuit in
Allison,” 267 F.3d at 164, opting instead for an “ad hoc
balancing” approach:
[W]hen presented with a motion for (b)(2) class
certification of a claim seeking both injunctive
relief and non-incidental monetary damages, a
district court must consider the evidence
presented at a class certification hearing and the
arguments of counsel, and then assess whether
(b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of the
relative importance of the remedies sought, given
all of the facts and circumstances of the case. The
district court may allow (b)(2) certification if it
finds in its informed, sound judicial discretion
that (1) the positive weight or value to the
plaintiffs of the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought is predominant even though compensatory
or punitive damages are also claimed, and (2)
class treatment would be efficient and
manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable
measure of judicial economy.
Although the assessment of whether
injunctive or declaratory relief predominates will
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we would follow the rationale of the “incidental damages”
approach, and reviewed plaintiffs’ requested relief under that
standard. Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 242. The court found
plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive damages were
not incidental to the injunctive and declaratory relief sought,
and thus not suitable for 23(b)(2) certification. The court
determined, however, that back pay “is precisely the kind of

require an ad hoc balancing that will vary from
case to case, before allowing (b)(2) certification a
district court should, at a minimum, satisfy itself
of the following: (1) even in the absence of a
possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs
would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought; and (2) the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought would be both
reasonably necessary and appropriate were the
plaintiffs to succeed on the merits. Insignificant
or sham requests for injunctive relief should not
provide cover for (b)(2) certification of claims
that are brought essentially for monetary
recovery.
Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted);
see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949–50 & 950 n.15 (9th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Allison approach in favor of “a similar
approach [to the one set forth] in Robinson,” “focus[ing] on the
language of Rule 23(b)(2) and the intent of the plaintiffs in
bringing the suit”).
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monetary relief that could constitute incidental damages under
Allison,” id. at 244, as it is “the kind of equitable remedy that
could flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”
Id. at 243; see also id. at 243–44 (“Recovery of back pay, if it
is ‘capable of computation by means of objective standards and
not dependent in any significant way on the intangible,
subjective differences of each class member’s circumstances,’
‘does not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate
merits of each individual’s case,’ and does not ‘introduce new
and substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex
individualized determinations.’” (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at
415)). Accordingly, in its certification order, the court allowed
for the possibility that plaintiffs may seek, in addition to
injunctive and declaratory relief, “back pay or other equitable
relief for individual class members if there is a protocol for
identifying those monetary damages which sets forth the
objective standards to be utilized in determining the amount of
those damages in a way that does not require additional hearings
on individualized circumstances.” Id. at 245.
Neither party challenges the court’s adoption of the
“incidental damages” approach to measure monetary
predominance, or the court’s determination that plaintiffs’
requested compensatory and punitive damages are ineligible for
class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2). Nor does our preceding
analysis of plaintiffs’ claims require us to take up these matters.
As discussed, the individualized inquiries necessary to
determine whether UPS has engaged in a pattern or practice of
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unlawful discrimination under the ADA render certification of
this class improper, even if plaintiffs were to seek solely
injunctive or declaratory relief. As UPS has not acted “on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief and corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), there
is no need to evaluate whether monetary relief predominates
over that injunctive and declaratory relief.
Furthermore, even if we were to agree with the District
Court that a finding of liability and an award of injunctive and
declaratory relief could be reached on a classwide basis without
addressing these individualized inquiries, such inquiries, under
the court’s analysis, would still be necessary to address certain
questions of individual relief with respect to each class member.
See Hohider, 243 F.R.D. at 208 n.69 (“[T]he individual
elements of a reasonable accommodation claim may be relevant
at the second, remedial stage of proceedings if plaintiffs seek
individual relief on behalf of individual class members.”). As
such, plaintiffs’ requested compensatory and punitive damages
would be ineligible for class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2),
regardless of whether the “incidental damages” or the “ad hoc
balancing” approach is applied. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 415
(“Liability for incidental damages should not require additional
hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s
case; it should neither introduce new and substantial legal or
factual issues, nor entail complex individualized
determinations.”); Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164 (“The district
court may allow (b)(2) certification if it finds in its informed,
79

sound judicial discretion that . . . class treatment would be
efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable
measure of judicial economy.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
According to UPS, the District Court’s determination
that compensatory and punitive damages predominate, in itself,
precludes certification of the class in its entirety under Rule
23(b)(2), and the court erred by choosing instead to sever the
problematic relief from the class and certify what remained.
Plaintiffs respond that the court acted within its proper
discretion under Rule 23(c)(4), which provides that “[w]hen
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4). Given the class certification’s other defects, we need
not resolve this matter here,25 but we note that a court’s decision
25

The interaction between the requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) and the authorization of
issues classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is a difficult matter that has
generated divergent interpretations among the courts. Compare,
e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745–46 n.21
(5th Cir. 1996) (“A district court cannot manufacture
predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4). The
proper interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions
(b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must
satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is
a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common
issues for a class trial. Reading rule 23(c)(4) as allowing a court
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to sever issues until the remaining common issue predominates
over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate the
predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be
automatic certification in every case where there is a common
issue, a result that could not have been intended.” (citations
omitted)), and Allison, 151 F.3d at 421–22 (finding plaintiffs’
request to “certify[] the first [Teamsters] stage of [their Title
VII] pattern or practice claim under (b)(3) is foreclosed by
Castano,” considering that the claim as a whole “implicates
predominantly individual-specific issues” and “the plaintiffs
have not agreed drop their claims for compensatory and punitive
damages as a class action issue”), with In re Nassau County
Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]
court may employ subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to
liability regardless of whether the claim as a whole satisfies
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”), and Robinson,
267 F.3d at 167 & n.12, 169 (calling into question the
understanding of Rule 23(c)(4) expressed in Castano and
Allison and finding the district court erred “in not certifying the
liability stage of the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment
claim for (b)(2) treatment,” as courts “should take full advantage
of [Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues in order to reduce
the range of disputed issues in complex litigation and achieve
judicial efficiencies” (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted)).
We have not yet engaged this specific question, nor need
we do so here. In Chiang v. Veneman, we stated “Rule 23(c)(4)
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both imposes a duty on the court to insure that only those
questions which are appropriate for class adjudication be
certified, and gives it ample power to ‘treat common things in
common and to distinguish the distinguishable.’” 385 F.3d 256,
267 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968)). Plaintiffs rely on this description
of Rule 23(c)(4) to support the District Court’s decision to sever
their compensatory and punitive damages claims rather than
deny certification entirely. While this language recognizes, as
a general matter, the discretion vested in courts by Rule
23(c)(4), we do not believe Chiang sheds much light on the
overall contours of that discretion or on the propriety of the
District Court’s use of Rule 23(c)(4) in the case before us.
Chiang involved a class seeking certification for claims of
discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin under
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which, in language
similar to Title VII, prohibits creditors from discriminating on
various grounds in the credit-transaction context. See id. at 259
(quoting ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)). With respect to Rule
23(c)(4), we found that, because the issue of whether the
defendant engaged in the alleged discriminatory course of
conduct was “easily distinguishable” from the issue of whether
class members were individually eligible to receive loans, it
would be permissible to “affirm certification on the former and
leave it to the district court to determine whether class
certification might be appropriate on the latter.” Id. at 267. We
note, however, that Chiang involved none of the complexities
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to exercise its discretion under Rule 23(c)(4), like any other
certification determination under Rule 23, must be supported by
rigorous analysis.
Furthermore, we believe several
considerations are relevant to determining “[w]hen [it is]
appropriate” for a court to certify a class only “with respect to
particular issues,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4): the type of claim(s)
and issue(s) in question; the overall complexity of the case and
the efficiencies to be gained by granting partial certification; the
substantive law underlying the claim(s), including any choiceof-law questions it may present; the impact partial certification
will have on the constitutional and statutory rights of both the
class members and the defendant(s); the potential preclusive
effect that resolution of the proposed issues class will have; and
so forth. See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
ch. 2 (A.L.I. Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1, 2009). Once the
District Court decided that plaintiffs’ compensatory and punitive
damages claims were incompatible with Rule 23(b)(2), however,
it did not explain why this determination did not interfere with
certification of the class for other purposes, nor did it address
what effect, if any, such partial certification would have on the
class action going forward.26
that are present here.
26

Plaintiffs, for instance, have demanded a jury trial in this
case. The District Court did not explain how the severance of
plaintiffs’ damages claims from the class may affect this
demand, particularly with respect to the requirements of the
Seventh Amendment—an issue both Allison and Robinson take
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In a similar vein, we agree with UPS that the District
Court’s conditional certification of plaintiffs’ request for back
pay was improper. A trial court must “make a definitive
determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met
before certifying a class.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d
at 320; see also id. at 319 (noting that the 2003 amendments to
Rule 23 “eliminated the language that had appeared in Rule
23(c)(1) providing that a class certification ‘may be
conditional’”). While courts retain discretion under Rule
23(c)(1)(C) to “alter[] or amend[] before final judgment” an
order granting or denying class certification, see id. at 319 n.21,
“courts should not grant certification except after searching
inquiry, and . . . should not rely on later developments to
determine whether certification is appropriate.” Id. at 320
(quoting 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 23.80[2] (3d ed. 2008)). Accordingly, even if the District
Court were correct that plaintiffs’ claims of injunctive and
declaratory relief could be properly certified under Rule
23(b)(2), it was not sufficient for the court simply to identify
back pay as potentially incidental to such relief, and grant it
certification on the condition that it later prove to be so. Rather,
before moving forward with certification, it was necessary for
the court to determine whether plaintiffs’ back-pay request
actually conforms with the requirements of Rule 23, including

up (albeit divergently) in their partial-certification analyses.
Compare Allison, 151 F.3d at 422–25, with Robinson, 267 F.3d
at 169–70 & n.13.
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Rule 23(b)(2)’s monetary-predominance standard. And, were
the court to find such relief could go forward under Rule
23(b)(2), it would then need to address how that relief would be
managed, specifying, for example, the methodology by which
calculations and awards of relief would be made with respect to
individual class members. See id. at 319 (pointing out that “in
introducing the concept of a ‘trial plan,’ the Advisory
Committee’s 2003 note [to Rule 23] focuses attention on a
rigorous evaluation of the likely shape of a trial on the issues”).
Such rigorous analysis would be appropriate were the court to
use either the “incidental damages” or “ad hoc balancing”
standard to evaluate plaintiffs’ back-pay request, as both stress
that only monetary relief sufficiently manageable on a classwide
basis may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See Allison, 151
F.3d at 415 (stating that monetary relief deemed “incidental”
and thus certifiable under Rule 23(b)(2) “should at least be
capable of computation by means of objective standards and not
dependent in any significant way on the intangible, subjective
differences of each class member’s circumstances”); Robinson,
267 F.3d at 164 (finding that “non-incidental” monetary relief
may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if it cannot be
adjudicated on a classwide basis in an “efficient and
manageable” fashion). The court’s deferral of this analysis post
class certification was an abuse of discretion.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the District Court
abused its discretion in granting certification, and the class, as
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defined, cannot be certified under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) with
respect to its claims and requested relief. Accordingly, we will
reverse the District Court’s order of class certification and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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